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Liteky v. United States: The Entrenchment
of an Extrajudicial Source Factor in the
Recusal of Federal Judges Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a)
INTRODUCTION

Ensuring that all parties in a trial receive the guarantee of a neutral and
detached judge is essential in maintaining a fair judicial system.' History
provides several instances of suspect judicial ethics, most prominent among
them the resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and the subsequent rejection of Clement Haynesworth to replace Fortas, both because of
alleged conflicts of interest in cases in which they presided. 2 These types
of judicial improprieties affront the judicial system by undermining the
public confidence. 3 As a result, Congress has attempted to preserve this
guarantee by the enactment of legislation such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and
455.4 These statutes deal specifically with the recusal (or disqualification)

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
242 (1980) (helping to ensure that life, liberty and property will not be taken through a
distorted conception of the facts or law); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62
(1972). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a neutral and
detached judge. Id.
2. See Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial hiterest as Grounds for
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 672 n.53 (1985). In
1969, Justice Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court under allegations that he received
improper extrajudicial compensation. Haynesworth, President Nixon's first choice as successor for Fortas, was rejected by the U.S. Senate in his confirmation proceedings, because of
his failure to recuse himself in cases where he allegedly had a financial conflict of interest
with one party in a case before him. See also Note, Disqualificationof Judges and Justices
in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 736-37 (1973) (providing more information
of this infamous case and detailing other instances of questionable judicial activities).
3. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 2, at 695. The judiciary depends on public confidence
of its decisions to retain its authority, and any hint of judicial bias or impropriety threatens
public confidence in the judicial system.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988), reprinted, infra note 19; 28 U.S.C. §455, reprinted in
part, infra note 29. See also Bloom, supra note 2, at 665.
Even though impartial judges are constitutionally required, disqualification
determinations very rarely are made on constitutional grounds. The
Supreme Court has held that "most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level." Instead, several statutory
provisions and the case law interpreting them provide the basis for federal
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of federal judges and those instances in which it is appropriate for judges to
recuse themselves. 5 Of particular concern to this note is 28 U.S.C. §
455(a),6 the "catch-all phrase" of judicial disqualification legislation,7 and
the court-shaped standards of its applicability in cases of possible judicial
bias or prejudice.
In 1974, congressional amendments to § 455 made substantial changes
to its original text, one of which was the creation of § 455(a), a more
objective standard for the evaluation of judicial bias and prejudice. The
1974 Amendments challenged a common law judicial power that allowed
a judge to deny a judicial recusal motion for bias or prejudice if the bias or
prejudice originated solely from judicial proceedings.9 The Supreme Court
had previously read this "extrajudicial source" doctrine into judicial
disqualification legislation introduced prior to the 1974 Amendments.10
For example, in United States v. Grinnell Corp.," the Supreme Court held
that judicial bias and prejudice, as defined under 28 U.S.C. § 144, may only
result in recusal when the bias or prejudice stems from an extrajudicial
source, a source outside of a judge's knowledge attained from participation
in judicial proceedings. 2 Following the 1974 Amendments, the federal
disqualification law.
Id. A third judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1988), forbids a judge from
hearing on appeal a case that the judge decided in the lower court. Id.
5. See infra notes 19 and 29 for full text of the statutes. For information about
judicial recusals at the state level, see, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions:
Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543 (Winter 1994).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988), reprinted, infra note 29.
7. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 n.8
(1988) (stating that § 455(a) is catchall provision in that it encompasses a larger number of
grounds for disqualification than do the other subsections of § 455.).
8. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1153-54 (1994) (citing Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)).
9. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 2, at 672-74, n.65. In 1974, Congress attempted to
broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial recusals by amending § 455(a) to resemble
Canon 3 of the American Bar Association's (hereinafter ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct,
which made some recusals mandatory. Id. at 672-73.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 583 (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921)). The Court did
not provide a clear definition of the extrajudicial source doctrine, but it did imply that an
extrajudicial source was one that originated from a source outside of judicial proceedings.
Id. A subsequent attempt at defining the extrajudicial source factor was offered by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re Huntington Commons
Assocs., 21 F.3d 157, 158 (1994) ("[T]he parties are entitled to a decision-maker who comes
to the controversy without predisposition, but not to a judge who is impervious to the
impression of litigants and the litigation."). Id.
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appellate circuits were divided on the issue of whether the extrajudicial
source doctrine should be extended to § 455(a) cases. 3
In Liteky v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court reviewed the issue of
whether the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to 28 U.S.C, § 455(a). 5
In a unanimous decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that intrajudicial matters are not a proper basis for
recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a), thus upholding the extrajudicial
source doctrine. 6 In a 5-0-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals on March 7, 1994.17
This note will review the Supreme Court's decision in Liteky v. United
States. Section I of this note will examine the historical background of
judicial disqualification legislation, paying particular attention to developments in § 455(a) cases following the 1974 Amendments to § 455. Section
II will begin by stating the relevant case facts and history of Liteky v. United
States, and will then address the reasoning of Justice Scalia in the majority
opinion and Justice Kennedy in the concurring opinion. Section II will also
discuss why this author believes that the concurring opinion should have
been adopted as the majority. Finally, Section III will look at future
implications that the Liteky decision will probably have on judicial
disqualification legislation, cases, and public policy.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. EARLY JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION LEGISLATION

In 1911, the first major piece of judicial disqualification legislation in
the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 144, was enacted. 8 Section 144 allows
litigants to file an affidavit alleging that a judge has a "personal bias or

13. Most Circuits have embraced the adoption of the extrajudicial source doctrine to

§ 455 (a). See, e.g., McWhorter v. Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States

v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980).
But see United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Coven, 662
F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982). For further discussion of the
Circuit split, see infra notes 45-53.
14. Liteky v. United States, 114 S.Ct 1147 (1994).
15. Id. at 1147.
16. United States v. Liteky, 973 F.2d 910 (1992).
17. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994).
18. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 666. Additionally, the current 28 U.S.C. § 144
originated from the Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090. It was amended and
codified by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 898.
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prejudice" against the complaining party or favoritism towards another
party.' 9 In Berger v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court held that the
judge in question may not determine the truth of allegations of personal bias
or prejudice levied against him. 2 Yet, the Court held that a challenged
judge, such as the one in Berger, must decide whether the allegations in the
affidavit are "legally sufficient," thus eliminating any possibility that
automatic judicial disqualification would ever arise.22 In United States v.
Grinnell Corp.,23 the Court introduced the extrajudicial source doctrine to
judicial disqualification legislation by applying it to § 144, stating that any
evidence of personal bias or prejudice must come from an extrajudicial
source.

24

In contrast to § 144, 28 U.S.C. § 45525 was a means by which judges
could recuse themselves from a case if they had a "substantial interest" in

Id.

19. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) provides:
Bias or prejudice of judge
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has
a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to
hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning
of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown
for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in
any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that
it is made in good faith.

20. Berger, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
21. Id. at 35-36.
22. Id. at 32-33. The Court intended to eradicate abuse of judicial disqualification
legislation and to guard against the filing of frivolous affidavits. Id. at 33-35; see generally
Bloom, supra note 2, at 666-67 (stating that § 144 protects the "orderly functioning of the
judicial system.").
23. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
24. Id. at 583 (citing Berger v United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921)). The Court held:
"[tihe alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case." Id.
25. Before it was amended in 1974, 28 U.S.C. § 455 provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material
witness, or is related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein.
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the outcome or in a particular party in a case.2 6 Judges had a great deal of
discretion in determining when § 455 should be applied.27 However, in
response to increased criticism of § 45528 and the realized and potential
abuses that accompany a subjective judicial disqualification statute,
Congress amended § 455 in 1974.29 The 1974 Amendments also introduced § 455(a),3" a section that Congress intended to be an objective
standard for judicial disqualification legislation.
B.

THE 1974 AMENDMENTS AND THE CREATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

In modifying § 455, Congress borrowed from the language of Canon
3C of the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct.'
An
26. Id.
27. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352. (Section 455 made judges the sole decider of their own alleged biases or
prejudices).
28. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972). Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist's
participation in this case conforms to § 455, but is subject to criticism. Id.; See also Bloom,
supra note 2, at 672 (citing Note, Disqualificationof Judges and Justices in the Federal
Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 736-37 (1973)). This Note criticizes the vagueness of § 455
and also provides examples of questionable judicial and political actions that resulted in
public outrage over the subjective judicial disqualification legislation. Id.
29. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 672. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) provides in relevant
part:
Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate
(a) Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding:
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer in the matter, or the
judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.
Id.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6354, 6355. Section 455(a) is a catch-all provision that provides an objective
standard of when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
31. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972) (replaced by Canon 3E (1990)).
Canon 3 reads in relevant part:
(1) A judge should [shall] disqualify himself [or herself] in a proceeding in which
his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instances where:
(a) he [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
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examination of legislative history shows that Congress enacted § 455 to
increase public confidence in the federal judiciary by introducing an
objective standard to replace the prior subjective one. 32 Additionally,
Congress intended to eradicate the "duty to sit" rule,3 3 which stated that a
judge had an affirmative duty to hear a case if allegations of bias or
prejudice were not proven.3 4 Furthermore, case law has echoed congressional intent to eliminate the "duty to sit" rule.35
Perhaps the most striking change resulting from the 1974 Amendments
to § 455 was the inclusion of § 455(a), the catch-all provision of judicial
disqualification legislation. While it seems clear that Congress intended that
§ 455(a) establish an impartial and objective standard,3 6 some courts and
commentators have suggested sacrificing impartiality in favor of increased
judicial efficiency and the prevention of judge-shopping.37 Congress
sought to balance the competing interests of preventing the waste of judicial
time and resources with the interest in keeping public confidence in the
judiciary high. 3' Another difficulty faced by courts from the enactment of
Id.
The bracketed material reflects changes made in a 1990 amendment that replaced
Canon 3C with Canon 3E, format found in Abramson, supra note 5, at 543 n.3.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6354, 6355. The objective standard of § 455 should promote public confidence
in judicial impartiality, for if there is a reasonable factual basis that judge is biased or
prejudiced, the judge should recuse himself.
33. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 2, at 673. The "duty to sit" rule urged judges to
fulfill their duty to hear a case if the disqualification was not proven. Id.
34. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 673. Section 455 has effect of eliminating "duty to
sit," which in turn would boost public confidence in the federal judiciary. Id.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 n.360 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (stating that the purpose of § 455(a) was, in part, to
eliminate the duty to sit rule); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (asserting that the new language of § 455(a)
was meant to overrule the duty to sit decisions); See also Bloom, supra note 2, at 673 n.65
for a brief discussion of these and other similar cases.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). For full text of § 455(a), see supra note 29.
37. See, e.g., In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that a substantial burden is inherent in transferring a case to another judge because
of judicial disqualification under § 455(a)); see also Bloom, supra note 2, at 664 (arguing
that excessive disqualification would undermine the operation of an efficient judicial system,
while judge-shopping would likely erode public confidence in judiciary).
38. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 664; see also Susan B. Hoekema, Comment,
Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court Judges Under
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L. Q. 697, 704 (1987) (stating that the federal judiciary should
tailor judicial disqualification legislation towards the goal of judicial impartiality while
recognizing significant countervailing goals of judicial cost and efficiency).
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§ 455(a) was the determination of the requisite amount of evidence needed
to show judicial bias or prejudice.39 Section 455(a) created a standard
much different than the traditional bias-in-fact standard promulgated in §
144. 40 Section 455(a) instead suggested an appearance-of-bias standard,
which merely requires that allegations of bias or prejudice be reasonable. 4'
Beginning with Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs,42 courts began to
extend the extrajudicial source doctrine, embraced by § 144 in United States
v. Grinnell Corp.,43 to judicial disqualification cases under § 455(a).4
However, there has been some dissention between various circuits of the
United States Courts of Appeals as to the relevance and applicability of the
extrajudicial source doctrine to § 455(a). 45 A number of circuits have
adopted the extrajudicial source doctrine for use in § 455(a), stating that the
extrajudicial source doctrine was applied to § 455 before the 1974
Amendments and that the legislative history of the amended § 455 fails to
mention any abolition of the rule. 46 Yet, commentators argue that the
legislative history of the amended § 455 does not mention the extrajudicial
source doctrine at all, and that congressional silence on the matter should

39. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 674-76 for further discussion of this topic.
40. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 674 (requiring that the allegations of a party alleging
judicial bias be sufficient to show that such bias actually existed).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). See supra note 29 for full text of statute. See also
Bloom, supra note 2, at 674-75. Courts have generally applied the appearance-of-bias test
in cases under § 455(a), making judicial disqualification more likely than under the traditional bias-in-fact test. Id.
42. 517 F. 2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).

43. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).

44. See Davis, 517 F.2d. at 1052 (holding that sections 144 and 455(a) should be read
"in pad materia;" both should be read to consider extrajudicial conduct as disqualifying as
opposed to intrajudicial conduct); Contra Bloom, supra note 2, at 676 n.83 (citing David
C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal Judges, 30 KAN. L. REV. 255, 262
(1982)).
45. See, e.g., Adam J. Safer, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Extrajudicial Source
Requirement Under28 U.S.C. §455(a), 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 787, 808-10 (1993) (describing
the rift between the various circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, which the Liteky
Court resolved).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977). This view is also prevalent in the following circuits: The Second (In
re International Business Mach. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1980)); the Third
(Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981)); the Fourth (United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1989)); the Fifth
(United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1986)); the Sixth (United States v.
Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990)); the Eighth (United States v. Jones, 801 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1986)); the Ninth (United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980));
and the Eleventh (McWhorter v. Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

not automatically be read as an acceptance or a rejection of the extrajudicial
source doctrine.47
Not all circuits have indoctrinated the extrajudicial source into § 455(a).
In particular, the First Circuit has continually held that the source of judicial
bias may originate in a judicial setting, and the extrajudicial source doctrine
was never adopted by that circuit.48 The First Circuit approach has been
praised by most commentators for its adherence to the original intent of the
amended §455, to keep public confidence in the judiciary high.49 The
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have neither expressly embraced nor rejected the
extrajudicial source doctrine in §455(a) cases, but have used other means to
determine judicial disqualification for bias or prejudice.50 Some of the

circuits that have adopted an extrajudicial source doctrine for § 455(a) have
carved out exceptions to the doctrine. The two main exceptions to the
extrajudicial source doctrine are finding a "pervasive bias exception" to the
extrajudicial source doctrine 5' and utilizing the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to defeat it.5 2 However, neither of these exceptions

47. See, e.g., Christopher R. Carton, Comment, Disqualifying FederalJudgesfor Bias:
A Considerationof the ExtrajudicialBias Limitation for Disqualificationunder 28 U.S. C. §
455(A), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057, 2078 (1994) (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)).
48. See United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1st Cir. 1990). The First
Circuit has always asserted that the source of bias in a § 455(a) claim may originate from
judicial proceedings. Id.; United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 758 (1st Cir. 1978)
(holding that § 455(a) is applicable even if the prejudice originates from information acquired
during the course of a judicial proceeding).
49. Bloom, supra note 2, at 695; Hoekema, supra note 38, at 717; Safer, supra note
45, at 809-10. Contra Carton, supra note 47, at 2079-80.
50. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the objective test
for the determination of bias is the correct standard, but does not address the extrajudicial
source doctrine); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 951 (1976) (holding that disqualification under §455(a) is necessary only when judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned;" without mentioning the extrajudicial source
doctrine). But see United States v. Pritchard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the extrajudicial source doctrine as the basis for disqualification for bias, but not
expressly attaching the doctrine to § 455(a)). See also Safer, supra note 45, at 807.
51. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). The "pervasive bias" exception was said to apply when a judge
displays such pervasive bias in a judicial setting as to merit disqualification because of
judicial bias against a party in the case. This exception arises solely in the judicial setting,
and thus is an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine. Id. The exception has been
applied by several circuits, but the Fifth Circuit has been the major catalyst in its growth in
popularity. See Safer, supra note 45, at 806 for further details.
52. The Substantive Due Process Clause is found at U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. 1.
("[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

IJTEKY V. UNITED STATES

1995]

has ever been addressed by the Supreme Court, and both have only been
used sparingly in judicial disqualification legislation.53
The Supreme Court, in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition
Corp.,54 broadened the scope of judicial disqualification under § 455(a) by
requiring a judge to recuse himself whenever "his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 55 The Court reiterated that the goal of § 455(a)
is to avoid even an appearance of impartiality, and established that this
appearance of judicial bias, rather than the reality of it, is the true measure
for judicial disqualification under § 455(a).5 6 However, the Court had not
determined the applicability of the extrajudicial source doctrine to § 455(a)
until its decision in Liteky v. United States.57
II.

LITEKY V. UNITED STATES

A. CASE FACTS AND HISTORY

On November 16, 1990, Father Roy Bourgeois, Charles Liteky and
John Liteky poured blood on federal property located at the Fort Benning
Military Reservation in the State of Georgia. 58 The three claimed that they
committed these acts in order to protest the slayings of six Jesuit priests and
two others by El Salvadoran soldiers trained at the School of the Americas
at Fort Benning. 59 Father Bourgeois and the Liteky brothers were charged
of law."). Both the Third Circuit (in Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.
1992)) and the Sixth Circuit (in Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1979))
have utilized the Due Process Clause to overcome the extrajudicial source requirement.
While the Supreme Court has used the Due Process Clause to disqualify state judges, it has
never disqualified a federal judge using the clause. For a detailed discussion of this dubious
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine, see Safer, supra note 45, at 803-05.
53. Safer, supra note 45, at 803-05.
54. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
55. Id. at 859-60. The Liljeberg Court held that a judge should recuse himself in any
proceeding where a reasonable person with knowledge of all the relevant facts would expect
that the judge knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, even if the judge
did not have knowledge of such circumstances. Id. at 860.
56. Id. at 860. For a complete examination of the Liljeberg holding, see Kenneth M.
Fall, Note, Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme Court Encourages
Disqualificationof Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1033 (1989).
57. 114 S. Ct 1147 (1994).
58. Id. at 1150-51. The blood was spilled on walls, carpets and display cases. See
Brief for Respondent at 2, Liteky v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) (No. 92-6921)
(1993 WL 384814).
59. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Liteky v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) (No. 926921) (1993 WL 387331). In their brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, counsel for the
petitioners referred to the activity as a "conscience-motivated, nonviolent act of civil
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with the willful destruction of United States property, a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1361.60 The three were found guilty of violating § 1361.6 t
They then appealed their conviction on the basis that the district judge
violated 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) by failing to recuse himself from the trial. 62
The petitioners protested that some of District Judge Robert Elliot's actions
during their trial demonstrated that he should have recused himself from
presiding over their trial.63
Before the district court trial began, the petitioners asked the district
judge to recuse himself under § 455(a) because of an adverse decision
rendered against Father Bourgeois in a previous trial in 1983.'
The
petitioners claimed that the judge displayed "impatience, disregard for the
defense and animosity" towards Bourgeois in the previous trial, and they
listed a number of complaints associated with the 1983 trial and the events
surrounding it. 65 However, the district judge denied the § 455(a) recusal
motion, arguing that intrajudicial proceedings were not a proper basis for
judicial recusals, and the trial continued.' The petitioners later contended
that the judge should have recused himself from the trial because he
admonished the defense during its opening statements. 67 The petitioners
disobedience." Id.
60. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 providing as follows:
Government property or contracts
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property
of the United States, or of any department or agency thereof, or any property which
has been or is being manufactured or constructed for the United States, or any
department or agency thereof, shall be punished as follows:
If the damage to such property exceeds the sum of $100, by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; if the
damage to such property does not exceed the sum of $100, by a fine of not more
than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
Id.
61. United States v. Liteky. 973 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1992).
62. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1151 (1994).
63. Id.
64. Id. In the previous trial, Father Bourgeois was convicted of an assault from his
involvement in an incident also stemming from Father Bourgeois' political beliefs. United
States v. Ventimiglia, C.A. No. 83-316-COL, 10 (M.D. Ga. filed Sept. 14, 1983).
65. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1151. Among these complaints were that the judge
periodically cautioned the defense to limit questions, cross-examinations and witness
responses to issues material to the trial, and that the court should not be used as a "political
forum." Id., Furthermore, the petitioners claim that the judge imposed excessive consecutive
sentences and he interrupted a closing argument by admonishing the speaker from introducing
new facts after the trial. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The judge disallowed mention of events occurring in El Salvador in defense's
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again moved for a § 455(a) judicial recusal at the close of the prosecution's
case, and it was again denied; the court then convicting the petitioners.68
The petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit,69 which affirmed the convictions on the ground that intrajudicial
proceedings are not a proper basis for judicial recusals. 70 They then
petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted.7 '
B.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the extrajudicial source factor in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).72 While all nine Justices agreed
that the petitioners in this case did not prove that the district court judge
improperly failed to recuse himself for bias or prejudice,73 four justices
disagreed with the majority's holding that a form of the extrajudicial source
doctrine should be incorporated into § 455(a).74
The Liteky majority began their analysis of the extrajudicial source
doctrine by looking to history for evidence of whether required judicial
recusal existed. 75 The majority found that the first provision of this sort
was enacted in 1911, and is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144.76 After
discussing a brief history of 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455,77 the Court
examined the original basis for the extrajudicial source doctrine as derived
from the Court's earlier decision in United States v. Grinnell Corp.78 The
Court refuted petitioners' argument that the word "personal" found in both
the language of § 144 and § 455(b)(1) but absent from § 455(a) be read as
an exception for "personal prejudice or bias" acquired through an extrajudiopening statement, and he admonished defense counsel to limit its remarks to evidentiary
matters. Id.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Liteky, 973 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1992).
70. Id. at 910-11.
71. Liteky v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2412 (1993).
72. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. at 1157. For discussion of the usage of the term "extrajudicial
source factor," see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 1163.
74. Id. at 1158. Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, and he was joined in his
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg.
The concurring opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, who was joined by Justice
Blackmun, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter. Id. at 1150.
75. Id. at 1151.
76. Id. For discussion of the early history of judicial disqualification legislation, see
supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 1152-54. For discussion of the recent history of judicial disqualification
legislation, see supra notes 31-57 and accompanying text.
78. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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cial source as opposed to bias acquired by a judge in the performance of his
judicial duties.79 Instead, the Court held that a pejorative reading of the
words "bias" and "prejudice" should be used, for these words suggest an
equally wrongful connotation whether the bias was acquired extrajudicially
or intrajudicially.80 Thus, the majority reasoned that the origin of the
extrajudicial source doctrine is based on the pejorative connotation of the
terms "bias or prejudice," for the words connote a wrongful or inappropriate
disposition for or against a party."'
The Court next concluded that a judge is not automatically recusable
for bias or prejudice against a party just because he or she becomes
increasingly ill-disposed towards a party during the course of the trial.8 2
Disqualification is not necessary, according to the Court, when the judge's
negative opinions stem from the proceedings of the trial, and judges are not
expected to remain immune from forming judgments from the evidence and
the proceedings of a trial.8 3 The majority also stated that historically, a
judge's previous judicial opinion involving a party in a current proceeding
did not constitute judicial bias or prejudice. 4
The Court then overruled the Eleventh Circuit decision that held that
matters arising from judicial proceedings are an improper basis for recusal8 5
The majority admitted that the extrajudicial source doctrine is not the sole
basis for judicial disqualification. 6 The Court pointed out that a bias
derived from an intrajudicial source may prove to be disqualifying if the
bias springing from it is "so extreme as to render fair judgment impossible."8 7 This is a reluctant acceptance of the "pervasive bias" exception to
79. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1153-54. For full text of § 144, see supra note 19. For full
text of §§ 455(a)-(b)(l), see supra note 29.
80. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154-55. The Court also gave an example of the complexity
of the use of the word "personal" by stating that the term "personal preference" does not
imply that a "non-personal preference" exists. In other words, the use of the phrase "personal
bias and prejudice" in some of the judicial disqualification legislation should not imply that
the bias and prejudice mentioned in § 455(a) is of a "non-personal" or intrajudicial nature.
Id. at 1155.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. Scalia quoted from Judge Jerome Frank's opinion in In re J.P. Linahan, 138
F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943): "Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean
child-like innocence. If the judges did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house
dramas called trials, he could never render decisions." Id. at 654.
84. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155.
85. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's strict exclusion of
intrajudicial source disqualification advanced in 973 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1992).
86. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. at 1155.
87. Id.
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88
the extrajudicial source rule promulgated by the Fifth Circuit.
Next, the Court addressed the petitioners' argument that recusal under
§ 455(a) is required whenever there is a genuine question of a judge's
impartiality, rather than if and when bias or prejudice originates from an
extrajudicial source. s9 The Court summarily rejected petitioners' argument,
stating that the word "partiality" also has a pejorative connotation equivalent
The
to the one the Court gave to the terms "bias" and "prejudice."'
Liteky majority rationalized that "partiality" refers not to all favoritism, but
to only that favoritism which is deemed wrongful or inappropriate.
Therefore, the Court held that the extrajudicial source limitation applies to
§ 455(a).9 The Scalia majority also attested that it would be contradictory
to find an extrajudicial source limitation in § 455(b)(1) but not in § 455(a),
for the two sections partially overlap.92 In addition, the majority refuted
the petitioners' claim that an extrajudicial limitation to § 455(a) would make
disqualification easier to obtain on the appellate level than on the trial
level. 93 For the aforementioned reasons, the Court found that the extrajudicial source limitation applied to § 455(a). 94 Scalia added that the Court
should refer to the limitation as an extrajudicial source factor rather than an
extrajudicial source doctrine. 95
The majority determined that the petitioners in Liteky asserted no solid

88. Id. The Court cites Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs., 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
For a description of the "pervasive bias"
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
exception, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
89. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155.
90. Id. at 1155-56.
91. Id. at 1156.
92. Id. Scalia states that § 455(a) both expands and duplicates the protections of §
455(b)(1). Id.
93. Id. at 1156-57. The petitioner refers to the holding in United States v. Jacobs, 855
F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1988), in which the court refused to allow district court judges to consider
intrajudicial recusal motions but allowed judges on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, the authority to disqualify the district court judge on remand. See Brief
for Petitioner at 21-22, Liteky v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) (No. 92-6921) (1993
WL 387331). The majority contended that the ability of federal. appellate courts to assign
a case to a different judge on remand stems not solely from judicial disqualification
legislation, but also from 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which gives the appellate courts the power to
"require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." Liteky,
114 S.Ct. at 1156-57.
94. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
95. Id. The use of the term "extrajudicial source factor" in judicial disqualification
legislation is preferred by Scalia, because the presence of an extrajudicial source does not
automatically establish judicial bias or prejudice, nor does the absence of an extrajudicial bias
preclude possible recusal for bias. Id.

424

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

grounds for the recusal of the district court judge.96 Petitioners'. motions
for recusal based on a prior judicial ruling by the judge, his admonishment
of petitioners' counsel and his alleged "anti-defendant tone," were held to
be inadequate to require judicial recusal under § 455(a). 97 The actions of
the district court judge were satisfactory to the Liteky majority because they
originated in intrajudicial proceedings and did not rely on extrajudicial
sources or did not display such a deep-seated favoritism towards a party that
would. render fair judgment impossible.9 8
The concurring opinion, penned by Justice Kennedy, cited two major
faults in the majority holding, although they agreed with the majority that
the petitioners failed to prove that the district court judge should have
disqualified himself. 99 Kennedy quarreled with the majority's contention
that the source of the bias is central to determining bias under § 455(a);
instead, Kennedy insisted that an objective "appearance of partiality"
standard is the relevant test for judicial bias or prejudice under § 455(a).'00
The concurring Justices argued that there is little justification or support for
the extrajudicial source limitation introduced in Grinnell,1 ' and therefore,
the majority should not have read the extrajudicial source factor as a prime
factor in determining judicial recusals under § 455(a)."0 2 Moreover, the
concurring Justices argued that the majority's "impossibility of fair
judgment" test for intrajudicial bias runs counter to the § 455(a) objective
standard of whether a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned,"
which was announced in Liljeberg10 3 The concurring Justices regarded
the majority opinion as a blow to the judicially-established goal of § 455(a),
for they felt that the majority's test was too lenient to properly regulate the
impartiality of the judicial system) °4 Finally, the concurring Justices
believed that the decision in Liljeberg was weakened by the majority
decision, because in imposing the limitations of § 455(b)(1) to § 455(a), the

96. Id. at 1157-58.
97. Id. at 1158.

98. Id.

99. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1158-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisi-

tion Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)).

101. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
102. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1159-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See infra notes 125-28
and accompanying text for further examination of this issue.
103. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. at 1161 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 1162. The Kennedy opinion placed a great deal of emphasis on an objective
standard of reasonableness, pointing out that a reasonableness standard is the prevailing
legally imposed standard of conduct today. Id.
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majority failed to recognize that the two sections operate autonomously.
C.

5

ANALYSIS

In Liteky v. United States,"° the Supreme Court held that the recusal
of judges for bias or prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is subject to an
extrajudicial source limitation; while admitting that in some cases, a judicial
bias or prejudice acquired during the course of a judicial proceeding is
subject to § 455(a). 7 However, the Liteky Court's interpretation of §
455(a) was true to neither the text nor the legislative intent behind §
455(a). 8 The Scalia majority opinion placed too much emphasis on the
source of judicial bias, and did not pay enough attention to whether or not
a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned"'" in a particular
case, despite the source of the bias or prejudice." 0 The majority did not
adhere to the holding of a recently decided Supreme Court case on point,
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,"' and the majority's
opinion, if not their decision, ignored some pressing public policy concerns. 2 There is also a strong probability that the Supreme Court
engaged in judicial compromise in deciding Liteky. Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion expressed a view of § 455(a) that remains truer to both
the text and legislative intent of § 455(a), and the historical and practical
public policy concerns inherent in federal judicial disqualification legislation.
The text of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) states that "[a] judge shall disqualify
himself in. any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
The majority reading of § 455(a) admitted that no per se
questioned.'
rule exists that requires that alleged partiality originate from an extrajudicial
source." 4 This holding is significant, for the Court recognized that bias
or prejudice acquired intrajudicially may be a valid means of judicial

105. Id. at 1163. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text for a closer
examination of the Kennedy concurrence in Liteky.
106. 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994).
107. Id. at 1155.
108. Id. at 1158 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion criticized both the
majority's literal interpretation of § 455(a) and the statutory intent to eliminate the
appearance of judicial bias. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). For full text of § 455(a), see supra note 29.
110. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1158-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. 486 U.S. 847 (1988). For additional background on the Liljeberg case, see supra
notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
112. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1158-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
114. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
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recusal, even if only recognized in limited circumstances." 5 However, the
majority incorrectly placed too much emphasis on the source of the bias or
prejudice instead of focusing on the alleged aim of § 455(a): whether or not
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 6
Commentators have stated that one of the major principles underlying
judicial disqualification legislation is the need to ensure public confidence
in the judicial system." 7 An excellent way to keep public confidence in
the judiciary high is to require judicial recusals whenever the public
reasonably believes that a judge's impartiality is questionable." 8 This
reasonable "appearance of bias" standard adds objectivity to judicial recusal
matters, and provides greater uniformity to judicial recusals than does mere
reliance on judicial self-determination."' Utilizing the test of the reasonable objective observer gives judges a concrete standard which they must
employ in determining the need for their recusal from a case. Judges have
the ability to determine when an appearance of bias offends the sensibilities
of the reasonable person, and this objective standard will help eliminate the
natural discrepancies among judges in deciding what types of bias or
prejudice demand that they recuse themselves. 2 °
In contrast, the Liteky Court advanced a restrictive standard for
dealing with bias or prejudice arising from an intrajudicial source: that the
judge "display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
fair judgment impossible.'' 2. The concurring Justices in Liteky assailed
the majority's use of a separate, more restrictive standard for bias and
prejudice originating from an intrajudicial rather than an extrajudicial
source. 122 The "impossibility of fair judgment" test investigates a judge's
actual state of mind instead of attempting to avoid the appearance of

115. Id. "[P]redispositions developed during the trial will sometimes (albeit rarely)

suffice." Id.
116. Id. at 1158 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 2, at 695 (describing the need to ensure public
confidence in the judiciary as a "fundamental interest"). Id.
118. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 695.
119. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1162 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cf New York City Development Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 978-79 (7th Cir. 1986). Section 455(a), which requires
recusal when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, was designed to benefit
the judicial system as a whole. Even if a judge mistakenly fails to disqualify himself,
substantive determinations of the court are unaffected. Id.
120. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. at 1162 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
121. Id. at 1157.
122. Id. at 1162. The Court goes as far as stating that this rule is difficult to distinguish
from a per se extrajudicial source rule. Id.

1995]

LITEKY V. UNITED STATES

partiality as written in § 455(a).' 23 The concurring Justices argued that
this strict test is inadequate because even if the odds of an unfair judicial
decision were quite high, the decision would be upheld if a slight possibility
of a fair judgment remained." For the aforementioned reasons, integrity
in the judicial system can best be maintained by adopting the standard of the
reasonable objective observer for § 455(a) judicial recusals.
There is much merit in the criticism levied against the Liteky
majority's interpretation of the history and legislation that they claim begat
the extrajudicial source doctrine, and the Kennedy concurrence in Liteky has
best addressed the faults in the majority holding. The concurring Justices
legitimately doubted the origins of the extrajudicial source factor, saying that
the doctrine was more a product of "accident than [of] design."" The
term "extrajudicial source" was introduced in United States v. Grinnell
Corp.,126 a case which predicated its existence on the following quotation
from Berger v. United States: "[t]he alleged bias [or prejudice] must be
27 Justice Kennedy
based upon something other than rulings in the case."'
insisted that the Grinnell Court read the Berger passage too broadly, and
28
thus, no satisfactory rationale for the extrajudicial source clause existed.'
Finally, the concurring Justices asserted that the majority acted in a puzzling
manner by reading a "significant" extrajudicial source factor into the judicial
disqualification statutes; for alleged bias or prejudice arising from an
extrajudicial source neither indicates that a recusal is necessary, nor
precludes recusals stemming from a bias or prejudice acquired during the
course of a judicial proceeding. 129
The concurring Justices maintained that the Liteky majority decision did
to a previous Court holding in Liljeberg v. Health Services
adhere
not

123. Id.
124. Id. Justice Kennedy further pointed out that in some cases, reasonable questions
about a judge's impartiality may be raised to no avail if the possibility of a fair judgment
remains. Id.
125. Id. at 1159.
126. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
127. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1159 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921)).
128. Id. at 1159-60. Kennedy stated that the Grinnell Court held that a per se rule
regarding judicial recusal under the extrajudicial source doctrine does indeed exist, but then
the Court apparently retreated from this staunch prohibition against bias acquired through an
extrajudicial source. Kennedy believes that there is a major difference between the
establishment of a rule that only requires recusals when the alleged bias or prejudice is
acquired through an extrajudicial source, and the rule in Grinnellthat provided that "judicial
rulings alone cannot sustain a challenge for bias." Id. at 1159.
129. Id. at 1160 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Acquisition Corp., a° for the Liteky majority ruled that the limitations to
the specific § 455(b) should also be applied to the broader § 455(a).'
In Liljeberg, the Court differentiated between § 455(a) and (b), noting that
an "explicit knowledge" requirement under § 455(b)(4) 132 did not apply to
judicial recusals under § 455(a). 1'3 Justice Kennedy, in Liteky, stated that
because there are cases when there is an appearance of judicial bias or
prejudice, the reach of § 455(a) is broader than § 455(b), and thus, the scope
of § 455(a) should be acknowledged as extending beyond the scope of §
455(b). 34 Moreover, the concurring Justices argued that the Liljeberg
Court meant to imply that not all § 455(b) provisions necessarily apply
equally to § 455(a), because there are "important differences" between the
two statutes. 35 The decision in Liteky to give effect to an "often dispositive" extrajudicial source factor not only weakened § 455(a), but also ran
contrary to Liljeberg, the Court's most recent interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §

455.136

The Liteky majority also failed to address many of the pressing public
policy concerns that surround the role of the extrajudicial source limitation
in judicial disqualification legislation. Those in favor of a strict implementation of the extrajudicial source limitation assert that it eliminates judgeshopping and alleviates the burdens on judicial administration.' 3 7 Propo130. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).

131. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. at 1158 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1988) provides:
He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
Id.

substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding ....

133. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1163 (Kennedy, J.,concurring) (citing Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60 (1988)). For a complete examination of
the
Court's decision in Liljeberg, see Fall, supra note 56.
134. Liteky, 114 S.Ct. at 1163 (citing Hall v. Small Business Admin.,.695 F.2d 175,
179 (5th Cir. 1983)). Justice Kennedy continued by stating that the majority's attempts
to
search for an area of overlap between § 455(a) and § 455(b) are futile. Id.
135. Id. Section 455(b) deals with specific incidents where judicial recusals are
required, while § 455(a) acts as a general "catch-all" provision which has a broader scope
for recusal than § 455(b) provisions do. Justice Kennedy surmised that it is critical
that the
appearance of bias remain intact under § 455(a), regardless of the impact of § 455(b)
provisions to the alleged disqualifying circumstances. Id.
136. Id. at 1162 (Kennedy, J.. concurring).
137. See, e.g., Carton, supra note 47, at 2092-94. Carton fears that if recusals originating from an intrajudicial source are allowed, a significant increase in the number of judicial
recusals will render the federal judicial system unwieldy, and will be costly both in terms
of
time and taxpayer dollars. Id.
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nents of the extrajudicial source limitation also reiterate that removing the
limitation will adversely affect judges, and thus, will interfere with judicial
independence. 38 It appears that the Court's holding in Liteky will enhance
judicial convenience and independence. However, these positive aspects of
the extrajudicial source limitation will not be fully realized because Justice
Scalia and the Liteky majority recognized that recusals may originate from
judicial proceedings, if only in limited circumstances.
Other public policy arguments were ignored by the Liteky majority. A
legal dilemma arises when a judge has previously formed an opinion on an
issue or a party in the court proceeding, the judge's opinion is known by the
public, and yet, the judge still refuses to recuse.' 39 This type of blatant
prejudice is sure to elicit doubt not only from the party who is disadvan4
taged by the prejudice, but also by the reasonable person. ' Again, this
runs counter to the legitimate goal of maintaining public confidence in the
judiciary.14 ' In general, this type of judicial activity should be strongly
discouraged, and perhaps the judges are not best suited to police themselves.
As it turns out, the Supreme Court's decision in Liteky likely hinged on
judicial compromise. Based on the sides the Justices took in Liljeberg, it is
probable that Justice Scalia had difficulty in obtaining five majority votes
in Liteky. 142 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor
all dissented in Liljeberg and went with the majority in Liteky, while Justices
Kennedy, Blackmun and Stevens all subscribed to the majority view in
Liljeberg and concurred in Liteky. Those Justices who preferred a more
subjective interpretation of § 455(a), namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, were helped in their cause by the subsequent retirements of
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, two advocates of an objective reading
138. See, e.g., Carton, supra note 47, at 2094 (asserting that if judges fear their removal
from a trial, they may temper their opinions and judicial actions, perhaps even to the extent
of issuing vague and lifeless opinions); see also ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
IA (1990) ("An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society.").
139. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 695. In other words, "[h]ow human may a judge be
and still be allowed to judge?" Id. at 695 n.199.
140. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 695.
141. See Bloom, supra note 2, at 695; see also supra notes 117-20 and accompanying
text for a more complete analysis of the argument for keeping public confidence in the
judicial system high.
142. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). The majority
opinion in Liljeberg was written by Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun and Kennedy. One dissenting opinion was authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who was joined by Justices White and Scalia, and a separate dissenting opinion
was penned by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 849. For the judicial breakdown in Liteky, see
supra note 74.
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of § 455(a).143 Perhaps Justice Scalia only chose to recognize the validity
of judicial recusals stemming from an intrajudicial source because it was the
only way he could retain his majority.'"
Scalia may have thought that
it was better to allow intrajudicial recusals on a limited scale, rather than
sacrifice the extrajudicial source factor and its subjective reading of § 455(a)
altogether. In any case, there was likely much politicking and behind-the45
scenes consensus-building in this 5-0-4 decision.
In short, the Liteky majority failed to recognize the importance of an
objective standard of the reasonable observer in determining whether a judge
should recuse himself from a case for bias or prejudice. What the majority
did allow is the recognition of intrajudicial recusals in only the narrowest of
circumstances, while ignoring the stated intent of § 455(a); that a judge
should disqualify himself when his "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."'
The concurring justices articulated a standard truer to the
intent of § 455(a), but sadly, fell one vote short.
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF LFTEKY V. UNITED STATES
The decision in Liteky not to erect a per se ban against judicial recusals
originating from an intrajudicial source is a small victory for those courts
of appeals circuits that recognized exceptions to the extrajudicial source
rule. 47 Those circuits that adopted the "pervasive bias exception" have
been vindicated by the Liteky decision, for the exception definitely covers
those biases labeled by Justice Scalia as "so extreme as to . . . render fair
judgment [impossible]."'' 48 However, the Liteky holding will likely stifle
most intrajudicial recusals because the holding is underinclusive and fails to
realize the importance of a reasonable standard in determining recusals
143. I do not include Justice O'Connor among those Justices definitely favoring a
subjective interpretation of § 455(a), for she did not address this issue in her dissenting
opinion in Liljeberg. Furthermore, Justices Brennan and Marshall were replaced with Justices
Souter and Thomas. Note that Justice Souter sided with the concurrence. Additionally,
Justice White, who favored a subjective reading of § 455(a), was replaced by Justice
Ginsburg, who sided with the majority in Liteky.
144. In other words, it is quite possible that one or more Justices held out until Justice
Scalia agreed to allow intrajudicial recusal in some limited circumstances.
145. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justice Ginsburg Goes 25for 25 on Voting With Court
Majority, WASH. POST, April 1, 1994, at A3. (Justice Ginsburg was most likely the decisive
vote for the majority in Liteky. Biskupic also reports that the Liteky Justice lineup was
unusual, and that Justice Ginsburg has a penchant for voting with the majority.).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
147. See supra notes 44-52 for further discussion of the circuit split.
148. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (1994). The "pervasive bias"
exception is further described at supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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under § 455(a).
The Court's reading of § 455(a) may potentially lead to further decay
of its articulated purpose; to disqualify a judge whenever his or her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 49 Furthermore, the federal
50
judiciary, already insulated from the political process,' now has at its
disposal the security to say or act in any manner without risk of violating
§ 455(a), except in the rarest of cases. This lack of public accountability for
judicial actions runs counter to the current trend of keeping the public
5
informed about the quality and character of its judges.' ' The public
awareness of judges and their failings is higher as a result of the Clarence
Thomas confirmation hearings and the increased role of the media in the
courts.'52 The Liteky decision may be seen by the public as an unwarranted show of faith in the judiciary at a time when public scrutiny of judges
has become more intense.
The ultimate fate of § 455(a) may rest on how the courts of appeals
decide to interpret the Liteky decision. Early indications of post-Liteky cases
show that the main consideration taken from Liteky is whether a district
court judge's intrajudicial remarks displayed a deep-seated or extreme
53 The Fifth Circuit has
antagonism as to render fair judgment impossible.
already largely ignored the Liteky decision by applying a reasonableness
standard in the determination of whether a judge's recusal was necessary in
United States v. Jordan.'54 However, this case is the exception to the

149. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). For full text of § 455(a), see supra note 29.
150. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Liteky v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) (No.
92-6921) (1993 WL 387331). Because federal judges are politically appointed for life, they
need not run for election, and thus, are largely protected from public accountability for their
actions. Id.
151. Id. "[L]itigants are often familiar with judges only through their courtroom
conduct." Id.
152. See J.Stratton Shartel, Legal Experts Divided on Impact of JudicialDisqualification Decisions, 7 No. 1 PRENTICE HALL LAW AND BUSINESS, at 1 (quoting Paul Rothstein,
professor of law at Georgetown Law School).
153. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kirk, 20 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a judge's
remarks in response to trial activities neither originated from an extrajudicial source nor was
indicative of a "deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism"); In re Huntington Commons
Assocs., 21 F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that ordinary judicial rulings and
admonishments do not reach the requisite level of a deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism
necessary to recuse a judge intrajudicially); United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3rd Cir.
1994) (holding that a judge's negative remarks about defendant and his counsel do not form
a basis for recusal if they are not deep-seated and do not render a fair decision impossible).
154. 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995). The court held that an objective observer would
doubt a judge's impartiality when the judge has a twenty-two year friendship with a fraud
victim in a criminal trial, and then sentences the defendant to an exceedingly stiff

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

general trend of adopting Litekcy, which the other circuits have done.'

5

CONCLUSION

In Liteky v. United States,'56 the Supreme Court minimized the
impact of the principal federal judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. §
455(a). The Court upheld the use of an extrajudicial source factor in
determining whether a judge violated § 455(a), while reserving the right of
judges to recuse themselves intrajudicially when the bias or prejudice is so
deep-seated or extreme as to render fair judgment impossible. However, this
limited application of the judicial recusal stemming from an intrajudicial
source is contrary to both the text and historical context of § 455(a).
The Court's decision in Liteky, as Justice Kennedy points out, focused
too much on the source of the alleged bias or prejudice, and did not
concentrate on the stated aim of § 455(a), which is whether or not a judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned" in a given case. While the
Liteky decision will likely lead to increased judicial economy and may help
combat the problem of "judge-shopping," the decision will not increase
public confidence in the judicial system. The Supreme Court did not place
much value in the public perception of its federal judges, despite the fact
that the objective "appearance of partiality" test is the relevant test under §
455(a). The Court's disregard of the test created by the legislature not only
runs against reason, but also may draw public inquiry regarding the
existence of a neutral and detached judge.
SHAWN P. FLAHERTY

punishment. The Jordan court made no mention of Liteky or the extrajudicial source
limitation in its holding; instead, it returned to the purely objective test advanced in the
Liljeberg case. Id.
155. See supra note 153 for a sampling of post-Liteky case law, which overwhelmingly
supports the use of the extrajudicial source factor in the recusal of federal judges under §
455(a).
156. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).

